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Abstract 
This paper uses a modified policy analysis matrix (PAM) approach to assess the 
efficiency of cotton production in five major producing states in India. The results 
indicate that cotton is not efficiently produced in the second-largest cotton-producing 
state in the country. Without government interventions in this state, it is likely that 
acreage will move away from cotton to more profitable crops such as sugarcane and 
groundnut. In addition, we conclude that cotton is not the most efficiently produced crop 
in the other four states; however, there is at least one crop in each state that is less 
efficiently produced than cotton. These findings suggest that Indian policies directed at 
maintaining the availability of cheap cotton for the handloom and textile sectors have 
induced major inefficiencies in the cotton sector.  
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Assessing the Competitiveness of Indian Cotton Production: 
A Policy Analysis Matrix Approach 
Introduction 
This study is an application of a policy analysis matrix (PAM) to assess the competi-
tiveness of Indian cotton, which is produced under a web of contradictory policies, 
including price supports, and various input subsidies, such as fertilizer, power, irrigation, 
and credit subsidies. Because cotton is produced under a wide range of heterogeneous 
conditions in India, this study attempts to measure the efficiency of cotton production by 
state. Interestingly, the results suggest that the second-largest cotton-producing state in 
India, Maharashtra, does not have a comparative advantage in cotton. This is inconsistent 
with results from the standard Hechscher-Ohlin model, which would predict that 
Maharashtra would have a comparative advantage in such labor-intensive crops as 
groundnut and sugarcane because of its large labor endowment rather than in cotton, which 
is a more capital-intensive crop. In 1996/97, cotton used 866 man-hours per hectare 
compared to 1,765 for sugarcane and 1,066 for groundnut. These findings suggest that 
Indian policies directed at maintaining the availability of cheap cotton for the handloom 
and textile sectors have induced major inefficiencies in the cotton sector and that 
significant improvements in productivity will have to take place if cotton is to be 
competitive in states such as Maharashtra.  
India is the third-largest cotton producer in the world, behind China and the United 
States, accounting for 25 percent of the world acreage but for only 14 percent of world 
production (calculated from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Production, Supply and 
Distribution database). Despite being one of the largest cotton producers in the world, 
historically India has been more or less nonexistent on the world cotton market. 
However, following a series of unilateral economic reforms undertaken by policymakers 
in the early 1990s, India has started to re-emerge as a major player in the world cotton 
market, accounting for an average of 6 percent of world imports since 1999 and for 5 
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percent of all U.S. cotton sold in 2000 (USDA 2001). During the first four months of the 
2001 marketing year, India accounted for an extraordinary 9 percent of all U.S. cotton 
sold for exports. Although the policy reforms were directed primarily towards industry 
and the international trade regime, India’s re-emergence as a cotton importer can be 
partly attributed to a reduction in input subsidies. More recently, the Government of India 
(GOI) announced its intent to reform the cotton and textile sector, however, no specifics 
were given as to what would be done or when.  
Despite ongoing GOI efforts to reform the cotton and textile sectors, severe external 
and internal constraints remain in place. One of the external constraints was imposed by 
the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), which included import quotas in the developed 
European and North American markets in contravention of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principles of open and non-discriminatory trade rules. Even 
more important are the internal constraints. They include a mandate to sustain the small-
scale traditional handloom sector, export constraints on yarn, government fixing of cotton 
ginning and pressing fees, subsidization of raw cotton production, and an overvalued 
exchange rate that holds domestic producer prices well below world prices. 
During the next decade, both the internal GOI interventions and the external trade 
constraints originally imposed under the MFA will fall. The Uruguay Round Agreement 
set a deadline of 2004 for returning textiles and apparel to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) disciplines that govern other commodities. India is also removing its own import 
restrictions in order to meet its WTO obligations, and profound changes are likely for 
cotton and textile production in both India and in the rest of the world as this wave of 
unilateral and multilateral liberalization overturns long-established patterns of production 
and trade. 
In light of these forthcoming external and internal changes, it is important to 
examine the competitiveness of the Indian cotton sector. In the following section, a brief 
description of cotton production in India, along with policies affecting cotton production, 
is presented. In the next section, the PAM technique is described. The third section 
provides a discussion of the data used and the modeling assumptions. The final section 
presents results with a discussion of the implications of the findings.  
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Indian Cotton Production and Policy 
As shown in Figure 1, Indian cotton production has been concentrated in the western 
half of the country. It can be divided broadly into three major regions based on climatic 
differences and regional heterogeneity in the availability of water and other natural 
resources that influence the mix of crops in various parts of the country. These regions 
are the northern region (Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan); the central region 
(Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh); and the southern region (Karnataka, Tamil 
Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh). The northern region is the primary producer of short and 
medium staple cotton while the southern states primarily grow long staples. The central 
region produces mostly medium and long staples.  
In the last decade, cotton acreage in each of the regions has increased significantly, 
with the total area increasing by nearly 2 million hectares during the period from 1990 to 
1997. Although the acreage in each of the regions grew in the last decade, the yield has 
grown in an erratic manner. For example, between 1981 and 1994, yields in the northern 
and southern regions grew at a rapid annual rate of 6.6 and 4.2 percent, respectively, as  
 
 
FIGURE 1. Indian cotton-producing states (area and production share in 1998/99) 
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compared to negative (–0.7 percent) growth in the central region (Chakraborty et al. 
1999). Because of the negative yield growth in the central region in the last decade, 
Maharashtra with 35 percent of the total cotton area accounted for only 21.5 percent of 
total production (Figure 1). The major reason for the yield increases in both the northern 
and southern regions may be the adoption of improved varieties and irrigated production, 
whereas the central region, particularly in Maharashtra, has witnessed little to no growth 
in yield because of the use of low-yielding varieties and the reliance on rainfall. Overall, 
cotton yield in India is one of the lowest in the world, mainly because of the lack of 
irrigation, limited supplies of quality seeds, and poor management practices. 
Cotton production policies in India historically have been oriented toward promoting 
and supporting the textile industry. The GOI announces a minimum support price for 
each variety of seed cotton (kapas) based on recommendations from the Commission for 
Agricultural Costs and Prices. In all states except Maharashtra, where there is state 
monopoly procurement, the government-run Cotton Corporation of India (CCI) is 
entrusted with market intervention operations in the event that prices fall below the 
minimum support price. In Maharashtra, cotton cultivators are prohibited from selling 
seed cotton to any buyer other than the Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing 
Federation. However, with market prices above the minimum support level (50-70 
percent on average during 1989/90-1994/95), the CCI’s role in cotton procurement has 
declined substantially over the years. In order to compensate cotton farmers for low 
support prices, the Indian government has supplied inputs to the farmers at highly 
subsidized rates. The important production inputs that are subsidized by the government 
include fertilizer, power, and irrigation. Fertilizer subsidies, the largest input subsidy, 
have more than doubled in the last decade, increasing from 60 billion rupees in 1992/93 
to 140 billion rupees in 2001/02. 
Three major groups market both cottonseed and lint: private traders, state-level 
cooperatives, and the CCI. Of these three groups, private traders handle more than 70 
percent of cottonseed and lint, followed by cooperatives and the CCI. Normally, Indian 
farmers sell their cotton in the form of kapas or seed cotton, mostly in a regulated market, 
which was established under the State Agricultural Product Markets Act (Chakraborty et 
al. 1999). The cheap cotton pricing policy is pursued at the border with the announcement 
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of yearly export quotas for quantity and types of cotton lint depending on the local supply 
and demand situation. In addition, a minimum export price is also established to act as a 
disincentive to export.  
 
The Policy Analysis Matrix and Measures of Comparative Advantage 
The PAM is a computational framework, developed by Monke and Pearson (1989) 
and augmented by Masters and Winter-Nelson (1995), for measuring input use efficiency 
in production, comparative advantage, and the degree of government interventions. The 
basis of the PAM is a set of profit and loss identities that are familiar to anyone in 
business (Nelson and Panggabean 1991). The basic format of the PAM, as shown in 
Table 1, is a matrix of two-way accounting identities. 
The data in the first row provide a measure of private profitability (N), defined as the 
difference between observed revenue (A) and costs (B+C). Private profitability 
demonstrates the competitiveness of the agricultural system, given current technologies, 
prices for inputs and outputs, and policy. The second row of the matrix calculates the 
social profit that reflects social opportunity costs. Social profits measure efficiency and 
comparative advantage. In addition, comparison of private and social profits provides a 
measure of efficiency. A positive social profit indicates that the country uses scarce 
resources efficiently and has a static comparative advantage in the production of that 
commodity at the margin. Similarly, negative social profits suggest that the sector is 
wasting resources that could have been utilized more efficiently in some other sector. In 
other words, the cost of domestic production exceeds the cost of imports, suggesting that  
 
TABLE 1. Policy Analysis Matrix 
  Value of Input  
 Value of Output Tradable Domestic Factor Profit 
Private prices A B C N 
Social prices D E F O 
Policy transfer G H I P 
Source: Monke and Pearson 1989. 
Note: Private profit: N=A-(B+C); Social profit: O=D-(E+F); Output transfer: G=A-D; Input transfer: H=B-E; Factor 
transfer: I=C-F; Net policy transfer: P=N-O. 
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the sector cannot survive without government support at the margin. The third row of the 
matrix estimates the difference between the first and second rows. The difference 
between private and social values of revenues, costs, and profits can be explained by 
policy interventions.  
The PAM framework can also be used to calculate important indicators for policy 
analysis. The nominal protection coefficient (NPC), a simple indicator of the incentives 
or disincentives in place, is defined as the ratio of domestic price to a comparable world 
(social) price. NPC can be calculated for both output (NPCO) and input (NPCI). The 
domestic price used in this computation could be either the procurement price or the 
farmgate price, while the world reference price is the international price adjusted for 
transportation, marketing, and processing costs. The other two indicators that can be 
calculated from the PAM include the effective protection coefficient (EPC) and the 
domestic resource cost (DRC). EPC is the ratio of value added in private prices (A-B) to 
value added in social prices (E-F). An EPC value of greater than one suggests that 
government policies provide positive incentives to producers while values less than one 
indicate that producers are not protected through policy interventions. 
DRC, the most useful indicator of the three, is used to compare the relative 
efficiency or comparative advantage among agricultural commodities and is defined as 
the shadow value of nontradable factor inputs used in an activity per unit of tradable 
value added (F/(D-E)). The DRC indicates whether the use of domestic factors is socially 
profitable (DRC<1) or not (DRC>1). The DRC values are calculated for each commodity 
in each state. The commodities can be ranked according to the DRC values, and this 
ranking is taken as an indication of comparative advantage or disadvantage within that 
state. A state will have a comparative advantage in a given crop if the value of the DRC 
for that crop is lower than the DRC for other crops grown in that state. Although the DRC 
indicator is widely used in academic research, its primary use has been in applied works 
by The World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the International Food 
Policy Research Institute to measure comparative advantage in developing countries. 
However, DRC may be biased against activities that rely heavily on domestic, nontraded 
factors such as land and labor. A good alternative to the DRC is the social cost/benefit 
(SCB) indicator, which accounts for all costs (Fang and Beghin 1999; Beghin and Fang 
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2002). The SCB is calculated as a ratio (E+F)/D. Land is more restricted than other 
domestic factors in India’s crop production. Therefore, an indicator for the SCB without 
land cost (LSB) is used to measure the return to this fixed factor. Higher values of SCB 
and LSB suggest stronger competitiveness.  
One of the main strengths of this approach is that it allows varying degrees of 
disaggregation. It also provides a straightforward analysis of policy-induced effects. 
Despite its strengths, the PAM approach has been criticized because of its static nature. 
Some do not consider the results realistic in a dynamic setting (Nelson and Panggabean 
1991). One of the ways to overcome this limitation is to conduct sensitivity analysis 
under various assumptions.  
 
Data and Modeling Assumptions 
The data requirements for constructing a PAM include yields, input requirements, 
and the market prices for inputs and outputs. Additional data such as transportation costs, 
port charges, storage costs, production subsidies, import/export tariffs, and exchange 
rates are also required to calculate social prices. In this study, a PAM will be compiled 
for cotton and its competing crops in five major cotton-producing states for 1996/97. 
These five states account for more than 85 percent of India’s cotton production and 
represent the various types of cotton grown in India. Most data are available from the 
GOI’s 2000 Cost of Cultivation of Principal Crops in India (India, Ministry of 
Agriculture 2000). The survey is a comprehensive scheme for studying the cost of 
cultivation of principal crops. The survey is based on a three-stage stratified random 
sampling design with tehsils (a group of villages) as the first-stage unit, village/cluster of 
villages as the second-stage unit, and holding as the third-stage unit. Each state is 
demarcated into homogenous agro-climatic zones based on cropping pattern, soil types, 
rainfall, and other features. The primary sampling units are selected in each zone, with 
probability proportional to the area under the selected crops. 
The most difficult tasks for constructing a PAM are estimating social prices for 
outputs and inputs and decomposing inputs into their tradable and non-tradable 
components (Yao 1997). For computing social prices for various commodities, including 
both outputs and inputs, world prices are used as the reference prices in the study. U.S. 
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FOB Gulf prices are used as reference prices for wheat, corn, and sorghum. Other 
representative prices used are the canola cash price, Vancouver, for rapeseed; the cotton 
A-index CIF Northern Europe (an average of the cheapest five types of cotton offered in 
the European market) for cotton; the raw sugar price FOB Caribbean and U.S. runner for 
sugar; and the 40 to 50 percent shelled basis CIF Rotterdam for groundnut. These world 
prices are obtained from various commodity yearbooks published by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture. The world prices are adjusted for transportation costs and marketing costs 
to be comparable with farmgate prices. For imported commodities, social prices at the 
farmgate are calculated by adding marketing costs from the respective CIF Mumbai 
prices (calculated by adding the ocean freight charge to the FOB price) in domestic 
currency. Similarly, for exported commodities, social prices at the farmgate are 
calculated by adding the marketing cost from the respective world reference price in the 
domestic currency, converted to domestic currency. Freight rates from Gulf ports and 
Rotterdam are collected from Pursell and Gupta (1999) and added to the FOB Gulf and 
CIF Rotterdam prices. These prices are converted to domestic currencies using market 
exchange rates. Finally, marketing costs are added to compare with farmgate prices. 
Following Pursell and Gupta (1999), marketing costs consist of an interest charge for two 
months at an 18 percent rate applied to the CIF prices plus 10 rupees per metric ton to 
represent other marketing expenses. Similar procedures are used for calculating input 
shadow prices for fertilizers and pesticides.  
Following Gulati and Kelley (2000), the social valuation of land is calculated as the 
ratio of net returns to land to the average of NPCOs of competing crops. The figure for 
net returns to land is calculated as the gross value of output minus the cost of production 
plus the rental value of owned land. Another important component of this analysis is the 
disaggregation of nontraded and traded inputs. Based on Monke and Pearson (1989), who 
suggested that decomposing all input costs is a tedious task and has only a very 
insignificant effect on results, some inputs such as land, labor, farm capital depreciation, 
animal power, and manure are assumed to be totally nontradable. Once the inputs are 
disaggregated into tradable and nontradable components, PAMs are constructed for 
cotton and its competing crops in each of the five states.  
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Interpretations of PAM Indicators 
The summary results on protection coefficients for cotton in various states are 
reported in Table 2. The NPCO coefficients show that domestic prices in two out of five 
states (Maharashtra and Haryana) have remained above their corresponding international 
reference prices. Of the three remaining states, NPC in Punjab is very close to one, 
suggesting that the domestic price is slightly below the international price, whereas in the 
other two states (Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh) NPCs are much lower than one. Similarly, 
NPCI values of less than one in all cases suggest that the government policies are 
reducing input costs for cotton in all of the five states. NPC values of less than one for all 
input and most output markets clearly show government efforts to support the textile 
sectors by providing raw cotton at a cheaper price. 
The EPC is a more reliable indicator of the effective incentives than the NPC, as the 
former recognizes that the full impact of a set of policies includes both output price  
 
TABLE 2. Summary results of the protection coefficients in major cotton-producing 
states in India (1996/97) 
  Wheat Rice Cotton Groundnut Rapeseed Corn Sugarcane 
Punjab NPCO 0.70 1.21 0.91     
 NPCI 0.72 0.69 0.88     
 EPC 0.70 1.34 0.92     
Haryana NPCO 0.73 1.57 1.09  0.85   
 NPCI 0.72 0.69 0.81  0.69   
 EPC 0.72 1.88 1.13  0.87   
Maharashtra NPCO   1.01 0.51   0.43 
 NPCI   0.81 0.94   0.73 
 EPC   1.06 0.45   0.41 
Gujarat NPCO 1.11  0.67 0.52 0.80   
 NPCI 0.78  0.85 0.93 0.68   
 EPC 1.17  0.64 0.46 0.81   
Andhra  
Pradesh 
NPCO  1.45 0.63 0.44   0.47 
 NPCI  0.75 0.85 0.91   0.74 
 EPC  1.71 0.57 0.37   0.45 
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enhancing effects (import tariffs) and cost reducing effects (input subsidies). The EPC 
nets out the impact of protection on inputs and outputs and reveals the degree of 
protection accorded to the value-added process in the production activity of the relevant 
commodity. The EPC values in Table 1 show that there are significant differences in the 
degree of policy transfer for cotton across the major growing states. Haryana and 
Maharashtra farmers enjoy a support of 13 and 6 percent respectively for their value 
added whereas in the other three states, particularly in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, 
farmers face a net tax of around 40 percent on their value added. 
The other PAM indicators, such as DRC, SCB, and LSB, for cotton and competing 
crops in each state are reported in Table 3 and their rankings in each state are reported in  
 
TABLE 3. Results of the state-wide indicators for cotton and its competing crops 
(1996/97) 
   
Punjab 
 
Haryana 
 
Maharashtra 
 
Gujarat 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Cotton DRC 0.65 0.96 1.35 0.55 0.78 
 SCB 0.72 0.97 1.27 0.60 0.82 
 LSB 7,141 11,017 2,281 15,781 19,265 
Wheat DRC 0.41 0.39  1.12  
 SCB 0.49 0.46  1.10  
 LSB 23,634 21,356  8,547  
Sugarcane DRC   0.33  0.46 
 SCB   0.37  0.49 
 LSB   58,304  67,283 
Rapeseed DRC  0.44  0.88  
 SCB  0.47  0.89  
 LSB  14,124  13,291  
Rice DRC 0.91 1.37   1.42 
 SCB 0.93 1.24   1.3 
 LSB 7103 91   841 
Corn DRC     0.36 
 SCB     0.44 
 LSB     10,698 
Groundnut DRC   0.34 0.44 0.27 
 SCB   0.41 0.51 0.36 
 LSB   16,461 20,223 16,182 
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Table 4. These indicators reaffirm the conclusions reached with the protection 
coefficients earlier. For high protection states like Maharashtra and Haryana, DRC values 
for cotton are much larger than their respective competing crops. In Maharashtra, the 
DRC value for cotton is estimated to be 1.35 as compared to 0.33 and 0.34 for sugarcane 
and groundnut respectively, suggesting that Maharashtra has a comparative advantage in 
producing sugarcane and groundnut rather than cotton. Government cotton policies, 
however, have led to significant allocative inefficiency because much land in 
Maharashtra is still planted to cotton. Similarly, in Haryana, the DRC indicator for cotton 
is close to one and is the second largest behind rice out of the four crops included in this 
study. DRC values for Haryana clearly indicate that it has a comparative advantage in 
producing wheat and groundnut as compared to cotton and rice. In the other three states 
(Punjab, Gujarat, and Andhra Pradesh), DRC values for cotton are found to be lower than  
 
TABLE 4. Comparative advantage ranking by crop 
State Commodity DRC SCB LSB 
Punjab Wheat 1 1 1 
 Cotton 2 2 2 
 Rice 3 3 3 
Haryana Wheat 1 1 1 
 Rapeseed 2 2 2 
 Cotton 3 3 3 
 Rice 4 4 4 
Maharashtra Sugarcane 1 1 1 
 Groundnut 2 2 2 
 Cotton 3 3 3 
Gujarat Groundnut 1 1 1 
 Cotton 2 2 2 
 Rapeseed 3 3 3 
 Wheat 4 4 4 
Andhra Pradesh Groundnut 1 1 3 
 Corn 2 2 4 
 Sugarcane 3 3 1 
 Cotton 4 4 2 
 Rice 5 5 3 
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one but not the lowest among the competing crops. In Punjab, the DRC value of wheat 
(0.41) is much lower than that of cotton (0.65), suggesting that the Punjab has a 
comparative advantage in producing wheat. However, at the same time, the DRC value of 
rice is much larger than that of cotton, even higher than one, implying a definite 
comparative disadvantage relative to competing crops. Similar situations exist in both 
Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, where DRC values for cotton are significantly lower than 
one, although not the lowest among the five crops. In both states, there is at least one crop 
with a DRC higher than one, suggesting that cotton is not produced inefficiently in these 
states. At the same time, cotton is not the crop with the greatest comparative advantage 
(highest ranking) in either state. 
Identical rankings were obtained using the SCB values, lending support to the DRC 
values. The LSB indicators lead to similar rankings in four of the five states, Andhra 
Pradesh being the exception, where the commodity ranking based on LSB is slightly 
different. Overall, the results suggest that cotton production in Maharashtra is not 
competitive and will be seriously affected by the withdrawal of government support. Low 
cotton yields in Maharashtra, the lowest among the major cotton-producing states, is the 
primary reason for its lack of competitiveness. To further illustrate this point, cotton 
yields in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat are around 350 and 240 percent higher than are 
those in Maharashtra. Despite these low yields, Maharashtra still accounts for a large 
share of Indian cotton production by virtue of its large cotton area; 35 percent of total 
cotton acreage (largest in the country) and 22 percent of total production (second largest 
in the country) comes from this state.  
Based on these results, it seems clear that any unilateral or multilateral trade 
liberalization of the cotton sector in India will have serious implications for agriculture in 
Maharashtra, with acreage being diverted from cotton to more profitable crops such as 
sugarcane and groundnut. Another important point to note is that cotton is not the most 
efficiently produced crop in any of the other four major cotton-growing states included in 
this study. This may imply that while cotton production in these states many not be 
seriously affected by either unilateral or multilateral market liberalization, any area 
diverted from less efficient crops (DRC>1) is likely to go to crops with greater 
comparative advantage than that of cotton. 
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Sensitivity Analysis on Comparative Advantages 
Following Yao (1997), sensitivity analyses are conducted to test whether the results 
would be substantially altered by changes in the underlying assumptions. In the first 
scenario, CIF cotton prices are moved up by 20 percent. The results indicate that this 
change does not affect the comparative rankings. Similarly, rankings remain unchanged 
when CIF prices are reduced by 20 percent. For the state of Maharashtra, cotton prices 
would have to increase by more than 30 percent for the DRC value to go below one and 
would have to rise by more than 100 percent for cotton to become more competitive over 
sugarcane and groundnut. Similar exercises were conducted by changing prices of 
competing crops, but the results remained more or less the same. For example, a 50 percent 
decline in either sugarcane or groundnut prices did not cause cotton to gain comparative 
advantage over these two crops in Maharashtra. In Haryana, a 30 percent increase in the 
price of rice would alter the comparative advantage in favor of rice over cotton. 
Changes in the input prices can produce similar results. The inputs most likely to 
alter the comparative advantage in favor of cotton depend on the competing crops. For 
example, in Maharashtra, the cost of irrigation is the variable likely to alter comparative 
advantage in favor of cotton over sugarcane. The sensitivity analyses results suggest that 
a 2000 percent increase in irrigation charges would alter the comparative advantage of 
sugarcane in favor of cotton.  
 
Conclusions 
This study applies a PAM for cotton and its competing crops in five major cotton-
producing states in India. The PAM indicators suggest that cotton is not efficiently 
produced in Maharashtra, the second-largest cotton-producing state in the country. 
Sugarcane and groundnut have significant comparative advantages in that state over 
cotton. In addition, the results also suggest that cotton is not the most efficiently produced 
crop in the other four states; however, there is at least one crop in each state that is less 
efficiently produced than cotton. Interestingly, in the major grain-producing states in 
India—Punjab, Haryana, and Andhra Pradesh—rice is found to be the least efficiently 
produced crop. In Gujarat, wheat is found to be the least efficiently produced crop. These 
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results are consistent with the government policies of achieving food security in grain 
through high procurement price and heavy subsidization of inputs. 
The validity of these results is further strengthened by the sensitivity analyses. We find 
that very large changes in either output or input prices are necessary to alter the results for 
Maharashtra. However, the comparative advantage results in other states can be altered by 
more modest changes in the input and output prices. The general conclusion from this 
analysis is that trade liberalization and domestic policy reforms that alter the current levels 
of effective protection could significantly affect the constellation of crops produced in 
different regions of the country. Because the Indian agricultural sector is so large, even 
modest changes in the mix and location of different crops could cause important changes in 
trade patterns. For example, wheat acreage could expand in places such as the Punjab and 
Haryana at the expense of crops such as rice and cotton. If such tendencies held for India as 
a whole, cotton imports could increase. If the current mix of price policies translates into 
cotton that is cheaper than world prices, such a change could harm small textile producers. 
Such costs would be more than offset by the gains from trade following the policy reforms 
but it would be important to pay attention to the way in which these gains are distributed to 
avoid putting undue stress on particular Indian industries. 
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